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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
CASENO.20060874-CA
Plaintiff,
vs.
SHAWN DAVID LARSON,
Defendant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appellant, SHAWN DAVID LARSON, hereby submits this Reply Brief in
response to the State's arguments.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The State argues Mr. Larson failed to preserve several issues and they are
not properly before this Court. The State's argument is without merit. Mr. Larson
raises only two issues in his appeal: (1) that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying his motion to dismiss; and (2) that Mr. Larson's trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to timely file a motion to dismiss and for failing to timely
appear at the preliminary hearing scheduled on August 27, 2003. Both of these
claims and all facts fairly encompassed within them were preserved below and are
properly before this Court.

j

The State also argues the record supports the trial court's denial of Mr.
Larson's motion to dismiss. However, while the State misconstrues much of Mr.
Larson's argument, the State fails to dispute the fact that the prosecution failed to
meet its affirmative obligation under the controlling statute to bring Mr. Larson's
notice of disposition to the court's attention and to establish good cause for the
numerous delays in open court. Failure to dispute these facts concedes them.
ARGUMENT

I.

ALL OF MR. LARSON'S CLAIMS WERE PRESERVED AND
ARE PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT.
A. The issues raised in Mr. Larson's appeal were preserved below and
are properly before this Court.
Mr. Larson argued in his opening brief the trial court abused its discretion

when it denied Mr. Larson's motion to dismiss; and in a subsection of that
argument, Mr. Larson argued it was an abuse of the trial court's discretion to deny
his motion when it was clear from the record that the State failed to meet its
burden of compliance. BRIEF OF APPELLANT ("Br. Appt") at 23-27. Mr. Larson
then noted that while he would normally have the "burden [on appeal] of
demonstrating that the trial court's factual findings [that the State met its burden of
compliance] are clearly erroneous, the trial court made no factual findings [in that
regard]." Br. Appt. at 27.
The State indicates it has difficulty understanding this argument. BRIEF OF
APPELLEE ("Br. Appee.") at 20. The State then argues Mr. Larson failed to
preserve the issue of the trial court's failure to make factual findings regarding the
2

prosecutor's compliance with her affirmative obligation below because he "never
asked the trial court to make findings concerning whether the prosecutor
adequately fulfilled her burdens under the UMDDA." Br. Appee. at 21.
This argument misses the mark and further ignores the fact that Mr. Larson
is not required to request additional findings about issues Mr. Larson raised in his
motion that the court chose not to address in its ruling. Mr. Larson does not and
has not argued the trial court abused its discretion because it failed to make factual
findings regarding the prosecutor's compliance with her affirmative duty. That
affirmative duty exists outside of any findings the trial court may or may not have
made. Mr. Larson argued that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied
his motion, particularly without acknowledging the prosecutor's affirmative
obligation or her repeated failures to comply with that statutory duty. Br. Appt. at
23-27. The trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law1 simply ignore the
fact that the prosecutor had an affirmative obligation.
Notably, the State does not argue the prosecutor did not have an affirmative
obligation to comply with the statute. However, in a roundabout way, the State
seems to treat this issue and other issues related to Mr. Larson's notice of
disposition as if they were being raised for the first time on appeal. The State's

1

Given that the decision wherein these findings and conclusions are made is the
ruling Mr. Larson is appealing from, the State's argument that Mr. Larson failed to
preserve the issue of the trial court's failure to make certain findings within that
decision that is being appealed from because he did not raise the lack of findings
after the decision was entered is not even logical.
3

argument is misleading, somewhat confusing, and unsupported by either the facts
or the law.
In a cursory argument lacking any citations to the record including Mr.
Larson's motion to dismiss, the State claims Mr. Larson failed to preserve the
fictitious claim that the district court failed to make findings regarding the
prosecutor's compliance or lack thereof with the speedy trial statute. Br. Appee. at
20-21. The State argues, "Defendant's claim fails because he did not raise it, let
alone expressly preserve it, below." Br. Appee. at 20.
Again, while this is not the issue raised by Mr. Larson, he did raise the
claim that the prosecutor failed to comply with her affirmative duty. Br. Appt. at
26-7. Thus, not only was this issue was preserved for appeal in Mr. Larson's
motion to dismiss, the State fails to offer any rebuttal to that claim and thereby
concedes the point.
Further, to the extent the State's argument might be construed as a claim
that Mr. Larson did not preserve the issue of the prosecutor's affirmative duty
below, the record flatly contradicts the State's assertion. Mr. Larson's motion
expressly raised the issue and the undisputed purpose of Mr. Larson's Sery plea
was to preserve Mr. Larson's right to appeal the trial court's denial of his motion
to dismiss. R340 (336-45); R420:3-4. This includes all of the issues raised in Mr.
Larson's motion and at the evidentiary hearing on the motion when Mr. Larson's
previous trial counsel testified about the State's failure to provide him with the
crime lab report. R416:74, 76-7. Of course, Mr. Larson's claim also encompasses
4

the findings of fact and conclusions of law set forth in the trial court's ruling he is
appealing from. It includes all of the record facts that are relevant to the issue that
were preserved below, which facts are fairly encompassed within Mr. Larson's
motion and are not new issues as the State claims. See, Br. Appee. at 32 (arguing
Mr. Larson's coerced waivers were not preserved even though the trial court
participated in those discussions and presumably considered them in its ruling); 34
(arguing State's failure to timely provide DNA evidence to defense was not
preserved notwithstanding relevant testimonial evidence presented at the
evidentiary hearing on the motion and thus presumably considered in the trial
court's ruling).
Mr. Larson's memorandum in support of his motion to dismiss includes
the following language relative to the several hearings that were conducted before
the court when the matter was repeatedly continued:
Nowhere in the hearing transcript of June 10, 2003, is there a waiver from
SHAWN DAVID LARSON, nor is there any finding that there is "good
cause" to continue the matter by the court. Note also that there is no
mention by the prosecution of the pending request for disposition. More
importantly it is a continuance which is more at the convenience of the
prosecution because of the numerous witnesses and the court rather than the
defendant. ...
... [At a subsequent hearing] no colloquy is held with the defendant, the
defendant does not waive on the record nor does the court make a finding
of "good cause" for the delay.
... [At a subsequent hearing] No discussion was conducted with defendant,
waiver sought on the record nor finding of "good cause" for the delay
mentioned. To this point it has been 170 days since defendant filed his
request for disposition. ...
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R232-33; Br. Appt., Addendum C at 3-4). Mr. Larson then argued as follows:
The Utah Supreme Court recognizes that section 77-29-1 places the burden
of compliance on the prosecutor. [Citations omitted]. As the Court
explained, "the prosecutor has an affirmative duty to have the defendant's
matter heard within the statutory period. Implicit in this duty is the duty to
notify the court that a detainer notice has been filed and to make a good
faith effort to comply with the statute." [Citation omitted]. The Utah
Appellate Court has also acknowledged that it is a prosecutor's duty to
ensure that the defendant is brought to trial within 120 days after filing a
notice. ... Ultimately, the trial court may find good cause based upon its
underlying findings of fact with regard to the reason for the delay [then
stating possible bases for finding "good cause"]. [Citations omitted].
Id. at 234 (Br. Appt., Addendum C at 5-6).
The State's argument that Mr. Larson failed to preserve his "claim that the
trial court's ruling was erroneous as a matter of law" is misleading because, after
that general heading, the State focuses its preservation argument on the trial
court's failure to make findings about the prosecutor's affirmative duty, which is
not the issue Mr. Larson raised. Therefore, the State's argument misconstrues the
real issue and attempts to circumvent the fact that the prosecution in this case
simply ignored and thus failed to meet its affirmative obligation to ensure Mr.
Larson was brought to trial within 120 days. As such, the State's argument has no
merit.
Moreover, the State does not claim that Mr. Larson failed to preserve the
real issue, which is that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Mr.
Larson's motion to dismiss.

6

B, The State's claim that the record supports the trial court's ruling
fails.
The State asserts Mr. Larson's claims regarding the trial court's abuse of
discretion rely "heavily on misrepresentations of the record[.]" Br. Appee. at 22.
This assertion is misleading because it seems to suggest Mr. Larson has
deliberately attempted to mislead this Court by citing the record facts in a
disingenuous manner. This assertion is not true, as a review of Appellant's
opening brief reveals. Mr. Larson carefully cited and quoted the record and left
out no facts, favorable or unfavorable to his position, that are relevant to his
claims. In short, Mr. Larson has made no misrepresentations and the State's
contrary claim is misleading and objectionable.
Moreover, while the State spends several pages (see Br. Appee. at 24-37)
discussing its theories about which party was responsible for the delays in this
case, the State's argument completely disregards the undisputed fact that for
several months after Mr. Larsonfiledhis notice of disposition, the prosecutor
never brought the notice to the trial court's attention, the prosecutor failed to meet
her affirmative obligation to ensure good cause was shown in open court and to
bring this matter to trial, and the trial court never made a showing of good cause
for delay in open court. Mr. Larson's request for disposition was simply ignored
for several months after he filed it. Therefore, the State's argument disregards the
plain language of the controlling statute and the case law which the State also
acknowledges as controlling. See, e.g., State v. Wagenman, 2003 UT App 146,
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1[15, 71 P.3d 184 (when a matter is continued the prosecution "has an affirmative
obligation to ensure that good cause is shown in open court... [and] an affirmative
duty to request that the trial court make its determination of good cause in open
court to ask the court to create a record in support of its good cause
determination.") (cited and quoted in Br. Appee. at 17).
In short, in all of the State's presentation of the facts, not once does the
State claim that the prosecutor met her affirmative obligation to ensure that good
cause for delay was shown in open court during the first several months after Mr.
Larson filed his notice of disposition. Therefore, it is undisputed that the
prosecutor failed to meet her affirmative obligation. This conceded fact should be
dispositive.
Further, the State misstates Mr. Larson's factual argument in a manner that
is misleading. In his opening brief, Mr. Larson argued, "During the first 120 days
after Mr. Larson filed his notice for disposition, the matter was delayed because
the State sought a stipulation to continue the preliminary hearing and then
passively waited for the federal government to bring charges against Mr. Larson."
Br. Appt. at 26 (emphasis added). This is a true and accurate statement that is
supported by the record. R409:l; R24-5; R26-9. However, in its brief, the State
misquotes this argument as follows: "According to defendant, the record does not
support these rulings 'because the State sought stipulation[s]' to continue the
hearings 'and then passively waited for the federal government to bring charges
against Mr. Larson.'" Br. Appee. at 26. Thus the State omitted the essential
8

clarifier, "a", and changed the singular "stipulation" to its plural form and thereby
changed both the entire meaning and the intent of Mr. Larson's statement.
Mr. Larson's focus in his Statement of Facts was upon the fact that the
prosecution never brought his notice to the trial court's attention and never
requested the court to make a finding of good cause for delay. Br. Appt. at 7-22.
He did not downplay any instance when his own counsel sought for or stipulated
to a continuance. He also quoted verbatim his recorded conversations with the
trial court when it was clear he did not want to waive his right to a speedy trial yet
felt compelled to do so. Id. Mr. Larson also candidly set forth his own counsel's
stipulations to and requests for various continuances. Id. Other than the first
request in June 2003, which Mr. Larson explained his counsel stipulated to, Mr.
Larson never claimed "that the State was the sole party seeking these
continuances." Br. Appee. at 26. Therefore, the State's recitation of Mr. Larson's
factual claims is misleading.
Moreover, contrary to the State's argument, prolonging prosecution until
the federal government decides whether or not to indict a defendant is not good
cause for delaying a state case. Br. Appee. at 27-8. The State cites no legal
authority to support this claim. Thus, it is inadequately briefed and this Court
should refuse to consider it. State v. Pritchett, 69 P.3d 1278 (Utah 2003).
The State also argues Mr. Larson's claim that an attorney cannot waive his
client's constitutional rights, particularly over his client's objection, is
inadequately briefed. Br. Appee. at 28. This argument is interesting. The fact
9

that constitutional rights belong solely to the defendant is so fundamental that it is
self-evident in the large body of law that relates in any manner to the rights of the
accused. For example, Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is
designed to ensure that a defendant, not his attorney, knowingly and voluntarily
waives all of his constitutional rights before entering a plea. See also, State v.
TarnawieckU 2000 UT App 186, 5 P.3d 1222 (vacating the defendant's
convictions because the trial court's failure to advise the defendant of her right to
a speedy trial was plain error). Notably, the State has presented no legal authority
to support its implied claim that an attorney's failure to appear may constitute a
waiver of the defendant's right to a speedy trial, particularly when the defendant
objects to the waiver on the record.
Further, the State's argument that "defendant's claim fails because the trial
court's ruling concerning the August 27, 2003 continuance was not based on
defense counsel's waiver of defendant's IJMDDA rights" (Br. Appee. at 29) is an
attempt to make a distinction without a difference. This hearing was only one
week prior to the expiration of the 120 days and there is no evidence to suggest
that without this delay, this case would have been brought to trial within the 120day period. Moreover, the next hearing was not scheduled until October 2003,
several days after the initial 120-day period. R43-5; R411.
The remainder of the State's factual allegations and legal arguments set
forth in pages 30-37 are already addressed in Mr. Larson's opening brief.
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II.

MR. LARSON'S CLAIM THAT HIS TRIAL COUNSEL WAS
INEFFECTIVE IS PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT.
The State asks this Court to disregard Mr. Larson's claim for

ineffectiveness of trial counsel, alleging that claim was not preserved below. Br.
Appee. at 37. This argument fails for at least three reasons.
First, trial counsel's ineffectiveness was preserved at the evidentiary
hearing on Mr. Larson's motion to dismiss. R416. Mr. Larson testified he had
repeatedly asked Mr. O'Connell to file a motion to dismiss, but Mr. O'Connell
failed to do so. R416:15-16. Mr. Larson testified Mr. O'Connell told him there
were no legal grounds for the motion. R416:16, 20, 25-6, 71-2. Mr. O'Connell
testified that while he did not believe there were any legal grounds to file the
motion, he "didn't rule it out at that point either." R416:72. When Mr. Larson
fired Mr. O'Connell, Mr. O'Connell testified he believed Mr. Larson had a "really
good appeal issue" on the 120-day disposition, yet Mr. O'Connell never filed a
motion to dismiss on that issue. R416:84-5, 87. Mr. O'Connell's performance
was clearly a key issue at the evidentiary hearing and, therefore, was heard and
considered by the trial court in its ruling and preserved by Mr. Larson's Sery plea.
Second, in its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Court Order, the
trial court found the preliminary hearing scheduled on August 27, 2003 was
continued because Mr. Larson's counsel failed to appear. R239. The court then
concluded, "There was good cause to delay the Preliminary Hearing from August
27,2003 to October 8, 2003 based upon defense counsel's failure to appear. Such
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delay is, therefore, attributable to the Defendant." R240. This is the ruling Mr.
Larson is appealing from pursuant to his Sery plea. Also, the trial court's previous
finding that Mr. O'Connell's conduct in failing to appear "impeded the
administration of justice [ a n d ] . . . his client's right to a speedy trial" (R37) not
only preserved the issue, it established trial counsel's ineffective assistance and the
resulting prejudice to Mr. Larson.
Finally, even though Mr. Larson's ineffective assistance of counsel claim is
not being raised for the first time here, it is well established that a claim for
ineffectiveness of trial counsel may be considered for the first time on appeal.
See, e.g., State v. Clark, 2005 UT 25, TJ6 (an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim raised for the first time on appeal presents a question of law). Mr. Larson's
claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to appear at the preliminary
hearing and for failing to file a motion to dismiss is an issue that was raised and
considered by the trial court below and is fairly encompassed within Mr. Larson's
claim that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to dismiss.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Larson respectfully requests this Court to find (1) that the district court
abused its discretion in denying his motion to dismiss pursuant to the speedy trial
statute; and (2) that Mr. Larson's trial counsel rendered deficient performance that
prejudiced Mr. Larson.
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Respectfully submitted this 12 day of June, 2008.

Jenifer j£7Gowans
Attorney for Mr. Larson
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